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THE most drastic answer to strained international relations is a declaration of war. The decisive action, short of war, is a severance of diplomatic relations. When diplomatic relations are interrupted, the ambassadors are recalled and the embassies are officially closed. Nevertheless, many members of the embassy staffs remain in residence and the diplomatic inviolability of the closed embassies is fully respected. Furthermore, the consulates continue their normal functions during such times because, by international usage, they are not part of the diplomatic organization. Secret matter in the embassies and consulates is therefore entirely safe from seizure or alien scrutiny during periods of severed diplomatic relations.
The outbreak of war presents a very different picture. The newly hostile embassies and consulates are immediately seized, and theft personnel is arrested for internment pending repatriation. When the imminence of war is recognized, a nation therefore becomes greatly concerned for the security of her secret communications and her secret correspondence, and takes steps to assure that nothing of that nature will fall into enemy hands when her diplomatic and consular posts are seized.
Thus, when a nation orders her embassies and consulates in particular countries to destroy theft codes, ciphers, code machines and files of secret correspondence, that action can mean only one thing — the close approach of war with those countries. A nation would never interrupt all possibility of secret communication with her diplomatic and consular posts in a country for any lesser reason.
In the pre-Pearl Harbor days, the Japanese regarded their Purple code as the one possessing the highest security. The system employed a secret machine for enciphering and deciphering. Only the more important of the Japanese posts were equipped to use that code — embassies, and such consulates as those in Manila, Singapore, and Batavia. Secret communications with other consulates were conducted in codes of a lower order of security.
During the critical last days of the peace, the Japanese were naturally bent upon preserving the secrecy of their war intentions. This consideration divided the transmission of their code-destruction orders into two categories; those that could be sent in the Purple Code, and those which must be sent in the less secure codes. For, during those times, the Japanese apparently did not consider the possibility that their Purple Code had been compromised.
To increase the security of their code-destruction messages to ministries and consulates not equipped with the Purple Code, Tokyo set up the special "Winds" and "Hidden Word" codes. For reasons made plain therein, the whole Winds episode is reserved for discussion in Chapter 10. The Hidden Word Code was set up by the following message:
Tokyo to Embassy, Washington, November 27, 1941 (Circular #2409. In parts complete.):
"HANDLE AS CHIEF OF OFFICE ROUTING.
"WITH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BECOMING MORE STRAINED, THE FOLLOWING EMERGENCY SYSTEM OF DISPATCHES, USING INGO DENPO (hidden words or misleading language telegrams) IS PLACED IN EFFECT. PLEASE STUDY THIS CAREFULLY.
"MAKE UP A TABLE WITH THE LEFT COLUMN CONTAINING THE CODE WORDS AM) THE RIGHT THE CORRESPONDING PLAIN (DECODED) TEXT. PLEASE SEE THAT THERE IS NO MISTAKE IN TRANSCRIBING THIS.
"EXAMPLE. A MESSAGE MEANING: JAPANESE AND U.S.S.R. MILITARY FORCES HAVE CLASHED, WILL BEAD: 'HIJIKATA AND KUBOTA CLERKS HAVE BOTH BEEN ORDERED TO YOUR EMBASSY ON 15TH (BEGIN SPELL) S T O P (END SPELL).'
"IN ORDER TO DISTINGUISH THESE CABLES FROM OTHERS, THE ENGLISH WORD S T O P WILL BE ADDED AT THE END AS AN INDICATOR. THE JAPANESE WORD OWARI (END) WILL NOT BE USED."
| Code Word | Meaning |
| "HATAKEYAMA | RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND .... HAVE BEEN SEVERED. |
| "HATTORI | RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND .... ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXPECTATIONS." |
| "HIJIKATA | JAPAN'S AND .... MILITARY FORCES RAVE CLASHED. |
| "KASHIWAGI | WE ARE COMMENCING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST .... |
| "KOYANAGI | ENGLAND |
| "KUBOTA | U.S.S.R." |
| "MINAMI | U.S.A." |
(Decoded in the Navy Department, December 2, 1941)
This message contained 53 code Words and their meanings. In the interest of brevity, most of these have been omitted. Only the code words necessary to an understanding of the example in Part 1 of the message and the "Hidden Word" dispatch received in Washington on December 7, 1941 (Chapter 8) are included.
Tokyo to Embassy, Washington, December 1, 1941 (Circular #2444):
"THE FOUR OFFICES IN LONDON, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ABANDON THE USE OF CODE MACHINES AND TO DISPOSE OF THEM. THE MACHINE IN BATAVIA HAS BEEN RETURNED TO JAPAN. REGARDLESS OF CONTENTS OF MY CIRCULAR #2447, THE U.S. (EMBASSY) RETAINS THE MACHINES AND MACHINE CODES.
"PLEASE RELAY TO FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY AND TURKEY FROM SWITZERLAND; AND TO BRAZIL, ARGENTINA AND MEXICO CITY FROM WASHINGTON."
(Decoded in the Navy Department, December 1, 1941)
Tokyo (Togo) to Embassy, Washington, December 2, 1941 (#867):
"1. AMONG THE TELEGRAPHIC CODES WITH WHICH YOUR OFFICE IS EQUIPPED BURN ALL BUT THOSE NOW USED WITH THE MACHINE AND ONE COPY EACH OF THE 'O' CODE (OITE) AND THE ABBREVIATED CODE (L). BURN ALSO THE VARIOUS OTHER CODES WHICH HAVE BEEN IN YOUR CUSTODY.
"2. STOP AT ONCE USING ONE CODE MACHINE AND DESTROY IT COMPLETELY.
"3. WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED THIS, WIFE ME BACK THE ONE WORD 'HARUNA'.
"4. AT THE TIME AND IN THE MANNER YOU DEEM MOST PROPER DISPOSE OF ALL FILES OF MESSAGES COMING AND GOING AND ALL OTHER SECRET DOCUMENTS.
"5. BURN ALL THE CODES WHICH TELEGRAPH OFFICIAL KOSAKA BROUGHT YOU. HENCE THE NECESSITY OF GETTING IN CONTACT WITH MEXICO CITY MENTIONED IN MY #860 NO LONGER EXISTS."
(Decoded in the War Department, December 3, 1941)
The War and Navy Departments quickly had evidence that the Japanese code destruction was proceeding apace. On December 3, the British Admiralty told them that the Japanese Embassy in London had completed that operation. By Saturday, December 6, sixteen "Harunas" had been intercepted, including those from the consulates in New Orleans, San Francisco and Seattle.
Japanese Embassy, Berne, to Japanese Embassy, Ankara, December 2, 1941 (Tokyo Circular #2447):
"ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO OUR DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS IN NORTH AMERICA INCLUDING MANILA, CANADA, PANAMA, CUBA, THE SOUTH SEAS, INCLUDING TIMOR, SINORA, CHIENMAI, AND ALL OUR OFFICIALS IN BRITISH (INCLUDING OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON) AND NETHERLANDS TERRITORY TO INFORM ME UPON THE BURNING OF ALL THEIR TELEGRAPHIC CODES EXCEPT ONE COPY OF OITE AND 'L'.
"RELAY FROM BERLIN TO LISBON, HELSINKI, BUDAPEST AND VIENNA; BELAY FROM ROME TO BUCHAREST, ———;RELAY FROM BERNE TO VICHY, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID; RELAY FROM RIO TO BUENOS AIRES, LIMA, SANTIAGO, ———; MEXICO CITY, PANAMA, BOGOTA; BELAY FROM BANGKOK TO HANOI, SAIGON..."
(Decoded in the War Department, December 6, 1941)
The final two messages of the Japanese code destruction series, sent by Tokyo early on the morning of the Pearl Harbor attack, are discussed in Chapter 8 with the other Washington happenings of December 6 and 7.
Taken in conjunction with the code destruction messages, Tokyo's instructions concerning the movements of personnel were also evidences of the imminence of war. During the summer and fall of 1941, Secretary Terasaki, an espionage expert, was in Washington to direct the creation of a Japanese spy network in Latin America. On December z, Tokyo ordered his immediate departure from the United States. The following exchange between the Washington Embassy and Tokyo resulted:
Embassy, Washington to Tokyo, December 3, 1941 (#1245):
"TERASAKI NOW IN THE MIDST OF ——— ——— ——— INTELLIGENCE WORK AT MOST IMPORTANT TIME. WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM STAY OVER A WHILE AND GO BY SAILING OF THE 19TH. TAKAGI ON TATSUTA MARU BUSINESS..."
(Decoded in the Navy Department, December 4, 1941)
Tokyo to Embassy, Washington, December 5, 1941 (#896):
"RE YOUR #1245: WILL YOU PLEASE HAVE TERASAKI, ANDO, YAMAMOTO, AND OTHERS LEAVE BY PLANE WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS."
(Decoded in the Navy Department, December 6, 1941)
Commander Kramer told the Naval Court of Inquiry that official Washington had no intention of permitting Japanese Embassy personnel to leave the United States during those early days of December, 1941. In other words, the Washington authorities recognized that war was so close as to make it desirable to block the departure of Japanese diplomatic officials, but no definite, unmistakable message conveying that recognition was sent to the Hawaiian Commanders.
By December 3, the Navy Department had Tokyo Circular #2444 and Tokyo dispatch #867, and sent the four messages which appear below. In the headings of these, the following abbreviated titles will be used:
| OPNAV | Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; |
| CINCAF | Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; |
| CINCPAC | Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; |
| COM 14 | Commandant, 14th Naval District (Hawaiian Islands); |
| COM 16 | Commandant, 16th Naval District (Philippine Islands); |
| NAVSTA GUAM | Naval Station, Guam. |
The multiple-address system has long been a feature of Naval Communications. The addressees arc divided into two groups — those to whom the receipt of the message will mean action, and those to whom it is sent purely for information.
OPNAV, For action to: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16, December 3, 1941:
"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONG KONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."
This message was prepared and released by the Director of Naval Intelligence. It is interesting to note that the file copy contained the following passage: "From the foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." That sentence, however, was deleted before the message was sent. Only Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner could release a dispatch which contained any deductions concerning Japanese probable intentions. This order had then been in effect in the Navy Department for many months.
OPNAV, For action to: CINCAF, COM 16, December 3, 1941
For information to: CINCPAC, COM 14
COPEK
"CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY PURPLE MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY PURPLE, ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AM) ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."
Although, in accordance with naval procedure, this message was addressed to the flag officer in each instance, the Copek means it actually was from the Decrypting Unit of Naval Communications to similar units on the staffs of the four addressees. It will be noted that it was sent only for information to Admiral Kimmel's staff unit and to that of the Fourteenth Naval District. This will be discussed shortly.
Recognizing that war was imminent in the closing days of the first week of December, 1941, Washington sent the following two dispatches, as well as many similar ones to diplomatic and consular posts in Japan and in Japanese-held territories on the Asiatic mainland:
OPNAV, For action to: NAVSTA, GUAM, December 4, 1941
For information to: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16
Transmit with Deferred Precedence
"GUAM DESTROY ALL SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER CLASSIFIED MATTER EXCEPT THAT ESSENTIAL FOR CURRENT PURPOSES AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE RETAINING MINIMUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANNELS NECESSARY FOR ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 AND OPNAV. BE PREPARED TO DESTROY INSTANTLY IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY ALL CLASSIFIED MATTER YOU RETAIN. REPORT CRYPTO CHANNELS RETAINED."
OPNAV, For action to: CINCPAC, December 6, 1941
For information to: CINCAF
Transmit with Deferred Precedence
"IN VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE EXPOSED POSITION OF OUR OUTLYING PACIFIC ISLANDS YOU MAY AUTHORIZE THE DESTRUCTION BY THEM OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS NOW OR UNDER LATER CONDITIONS OF GREATER EMERGENCY. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION TO SUPPORT OUR CURRENT OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SHOULD OF COURSE BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT."
These last two dispatches were matters of cognizance of the Communications Security Division of Naval Communications. In the draft of this dispatch of December 6, prepared by the Head of that Division, the context began with the phrase, "in view of the imminence of war." It was testified that the Director of Naval Communications ordered the changes which produced the final wording of the message, as set forth above. It will be noted that the words, "in view of the imminence of war," were deleted and the highly misleading expression, "now or under later conditions of greater emergency," was substituted. We have seen how information was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders during those days. It now appears that an offshoot of that doctrine of denial, during the early days of December, was avoidance of the suggestion that war was very close at hand, in messages that had to be sent into the Pacific.
According to routine Naval Communications procedure, messages are assigned one of the following precedence classifications: (1) priority, to require the promptest possible transmission and delivery; (2) routine, to assure handling free of unnecessary delays; (3) deferred, to indicate that there is no particular urgency connected with the delivery. Unless a dispatch is definitely marked to indicate priority or routine precedence, it is forwarded with deferred precedence. To prevent undue delays in the handling of deferred precedence messages, a limiting time for their delivery is usually indicated in the heading of the dispatch.
The Judge Advocate of the Naval Court of Inquiry tried to establish why Rear Admiral Noyes, as late as the afternoon of December 6, 1941, had released the last of the dispatches with a deferred precedence. The answer was very vague, but its essence seemed to be that when the witness, as Director of Naval Communications, personally ordered the sending of a message, it went out very quickly, no matter what precedence it was given. The Court showed no further interest in the incident.
Nevertheless, Rear Admiral Noyes did not begin to answer the implications which must be drawn from the precedence assigned to this dispatch, so late in the rapidly developing Pacific situation. In the first place, no matter how fast the dispatch left Washington, as a result of its particular handling there, once it got into the system, its further progress Would necessarily have been handicapped by its obvious unimportance. Not only was this a message of deferred precedence, but no limit was placed upon its deferred time of delivery.
The handling of these four code-destruction messages by the Navy Department was most unfortunate. After all the information that had been denied the Hawaiian Commanders, here was the conclusive evidence that Japan was on the verge of initiating war with the United States and Great Britain, and the transmission of that evidence to the Naval Commanders in Hawaii was badly bungled.
The first dispatch of December 3 was unfortunately worded. The destruction by the Japanese posts of "most of their codes and ciphers" meant that war was in the offing, but that the close approach to its initiation would be indicated later by a Tokyo order to destroy all secret matter. Actually, the Tokyo dispatches of December 1 and 2 had, in effect, ordered that complete destruction. The single exception was the Washington Embassy which was told to keep one set of codes and one cipher machine, clearly to enable it to receive further messages from Tokyo, including the one which would initiate the war.
The Copek dispatch of the same day was more accurately worded. It was apparently sent to assure that the Corregidor Decrypting Unit had a copy of this Magic message. That could explain why it was sent for action to the staffs of the Asiatic Commanders, and merely for information to the staffs of the Hawaiian recipients. As Admiral Kimmel did not know about the Philippine on-the-spot reception of Magic, the different addressee classifications for the Asiatic and Hawaiian Commands could easily lead to confused deductions by him.
The wording of the dispatch dated December 6 certainly conveyed no inkling that war could be expected in a matter of hours. Furthermore, the deferred preference assigned that dispatch and the one to Guam, dated December 4, carried no suggestion of urgency of execution, even as late as the eve of the Japanese attack. The natural deduction in Hawaii from the four messages, as worded and sent, must be that the Washington authorities did not consider the outbreak of war unduly close at hand.
All of which emphasizes that there should not have been any danger, at that late date, that the Hawaiian Commanders could draw erroneous conclusions from the careless wording of two dispatches, the thoughtless addressing of another, and the deferred precedence assigned for the transmission of two others. Such deductions would have been impossible if those Commanders had been receiving the most significant of the decoded intercepts on the Tokyo-Washington, Tokyo-Berlin, and Tokyo-Honolulu circuits.