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Information-Orders and Actions Prior to December 7, 1941
In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones, so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.—Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War 1940-1945.
DURING THE YEAR 1941, I received many dispatches and letters from the Chief of Naval Operations which can best be described as "war warnings."
On January 21, 1941, he sent a dispatch to the commander-in-chief which stated:
The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan Dog my memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan Rainbow Three with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles Detachment. Pacific Fleet awaiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in Area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.[1]
On February 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch from the United States naval attaché in London, which stated:
I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indo-China Malaya Peninsula of the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese merchant vessel sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state, that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo China scene meeting aboard Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits.[2]
On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch which stated:
The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo-China...[3]
The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by the first of August.
On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me another dispatch. This reported that the Japanese government had issued orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific.[4] Under these orders all Nipponese merchant vessels would be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It related information from unusually reliable Chinese sources that within two weeks Japan would abrogate the neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows:
The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20—August 1 is indicated by the foregoing. (Italics supplied.)
On July 25, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch in which the Chief of Staff joined. This advised that on July 25 the United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. It stated in part:
...The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Army and Naval subordinates...[5]
In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Operations' letters to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 1941. His letters used such expressions as:
"What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess." (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)
An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941.
"Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941.)
"...Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate." (August 21, 1941.)
"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender." (August 28, 1941.)
"P.S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse." (September 23, 1941.)
None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack in the Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was imminent or probable. None of these letters or dispatches directed an alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack.
On the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor." He said Mr. Grew had telegraphed the State Department on January 27, 1941:
The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff.
The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added:
The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the pres. ent disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. (Italics supplied.)[6]
This estimate as to the improbability of a move against Pearl Harbor was never withdrawn.
Consider my situation as commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these ominous predictions of Japanese aggression in the Far East.
I was carrying out an intensive training program to prepare the fleet for war. I was under specific injunction to continue that program. In an official letter to me on April 3, 1941 (Serial 038612), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote:
In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called up to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into War.
On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.[7] Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, two weeks before the attack.[8]
I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in the Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war.
During the time span covering the sending of these dispatches the Navy Department knew just what my program in Hawaii was. My fleet operating schedules were filed with the Navy Department, where the location and movement of substantially every ship in the fleet was known at all times.[9] No dispatch or letter contained any order or suggestion for departure from my operating schedules.
When the War and Navy Departments wished to put the forces in Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did use appropriate language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrates this. That dispatch stated:
Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communications direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.[10]
In compliance with this order an alert was placed in effect with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. To be sure, the overseas scouting was limited to such a small arc and range as to constitute no more than a token reconnaissance. This alert was continued for about a month when orders from Washington directed it be discontinued.
At any time prior to the attack which commenced at about 7:55 A.M. Hawaiian time on December 7, 1941, Washington could have ordered an alert which would have been effective immediately in Hawaii.
As has been said, the chief of staff of the Army had on his desk in Washington a telephone with a direct connection to the headquarters of the commanding general in Hawaii. Conversations began over this circuit within twenty minutes after the attack commenced.
An urgent priority message by naval communications would have been received, decoded and delivered within less than half an hour after it was filed in Washington.
Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several courses open. It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of Japanese intentions and plans, the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages. This would have given me an opportunity to judge for myself the gravity and intensity of the crisis as December 7, 1941, approached, and the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Navy Department failed to do this. The Navy Department did not permit me to evaluate for myself the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages.
Another course of action then remained. That was to issue an order which would have directed disposition of the fleet to guard against an attack in Hawaii. The message of June 17, 1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was such an order. It would have had the same effect in December of 1941 as it had in June of 1940. Such an order was not given. Further, the War and Navy Departments could have ordered the local commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, Admiral Bloch and General Short, to execute the joint coastal frontier defense plan. This was not done.
The Navy Department could have given the order to mobilize under the War Plan. This order would have had a definite meaning. It would have placed the fleet on an all-out war basis. The order to mobilize did not authorize acts of war.[11] The dispatch of January 21, 1941, indicated that mobilization would be ordered when war was imminent.[12] The order to mobilize was not given.
In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941, I was not given available information as to the actual status of Japanese-American negotiations and as to Japanese military plans; nor was I given orders for alert against an attack on Hawaii. These dispatches had the same tenor as the warnings which had previously been sent in February, June, and July, 1941, predicting probable Japanese action thousands of miles from the Hawaiian area.
On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, the following dispatch:
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S.In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.[13]
The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certain preparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume a war patrol off both Wake and Midway.[14] I reinforced Johnston and Wake, with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island. I ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands. He did so and reported his action to me.[15] I placed on twelve hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast navy yard. I dispatched twelve patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the Island, and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas.[16]
On October 22, I reported by letter all these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations who specifically approved them, he wrote: "OK on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet."
The Naval Court of Inquiry found:
He [Admiral Kimmel] did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all experienced officers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand.
In the dispatch of October 16, 1941, I was advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. I did not know, what I learned for the first time from testimony before the congressional committee in 1946, that my government had promised armed support to the British if the Japanese attacked them.[17] Furthermore, the foregoing advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said:
Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. (Italics supplied.)
This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark stated certain Japanese action to be "possible," he meant that it was not probable.
In his letter of October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from Captain R. E. Schuirmann, who was in charge of the Navy's liaison with the State Department. Admiral Stark stated in his letter that this memorandum by Captain Schuirmann "sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down."
The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memorandum were not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 began: "The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave crisis." The memorandum began: "I believe we are inclined to over-estimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese Policy of thought or action."
The memorandum further stated: "Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen." The memorandum was to the effect that the Japanese military would determine Japan's policy regardless of the cabinet in power.
On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was addressed to me, the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the commandants of the Eleventh, Twelth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts. This dispatch read as follows:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.[18]
Under date of November 25, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me a letter which reached me on December 3. This letter contained a postscript added after a "meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today." The dates of the conference and the postscripts are not known to me. In the postscript he wrote:
...From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for: or we may do nothing—I think it more likely to be "anything." (Italics supplied.)
On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me and to the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the following dispatch:
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.[19]
On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions.
The first of these dispatches was as follows:
Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.[20]
The second of these dispatches was as follows:
In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provide you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable. (Italics supplied.)[21]
The so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by the Navy Department that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained.
The dispatch warned of war—where?
In the Far East. The dispatch stated:
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.
Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula were stated to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to "possible" objectives, Borneo was the only one specified. Hawaii was not mentioned. As the Naval Court of Inquiry points out, "No reference was made to the possibility of an aggressive movement in any direction as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November." This indicated to us in the fleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department had obtained later information, on the basis of which it could specify both probable and possible Japanese objectives.
Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received on November 27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" dispatch, were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.
One of these dispatches proposed that I send twenty-five Army pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to each of the islands of Wake and Midway.[22] The other dispatch proposed the re-enforcement of Marine defense battalions on Midway and Wake with Army troops.[23]
About the same time General Short received a dispatch from the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take over the defense of these islands from the Marines.[24] Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and Navy Departments were in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project.
The proposed exchange of Army troops for Marines on the outlying island bases was not feasible. General Short and I had extensive conferences on the subject. I learned that the Army had no guns, either surface or antiaircraft, to equip any troops which might relieve or reenforce the Marines. Thus, if the Marines were withdrawn, their equipment and arms would have to be left for the Army. I did not have sufficient additional supplies to reequip and rearm the Marines removed. The Marines stationed on the islands were trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards which could be immediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. The Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense battalion, so that the Army garrison would have required a new table of organization. The proposed relief of the Marine garrisons by Army troops would necessarily disrupt the defense of the islands during the period that one garrison was preparing to depart and the other was being installed.
Furthermore, at Wake, the most westerly of the two islands, there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships underway in an open seaway. Ships had been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as twenty-eight days due to bad weather. It was not unusual for a ship to take as much as seven or eight days. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible.
I believed that responsible authorities in Washington would not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circumstances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying bases was imminent.
I promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the Marines should not be withdrawn from the outlying islands until the Army had received arms and equipment for its defense battalions and had adequately trained them.[25]
The replacement of Marine planes on the islands of Wake and Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Washington, was also impracticable. At conferences with the Army on this matter, the commanding general of the Hawaiian air detachment stated that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness in the island's defense. I so advised the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch and letter.[26]
The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send to outlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted approximately fifty per cent of the Army's pursuit strength on Oahu. The very fact that the War and Navy Departments proposed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable.
In brief, on November 27, subsequent to what was a virtual ultimatum to Japan on November 26 the issuance of which I was not informed, the Navy Department suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriers of the fleet which constituted the fleet's main striking defense against an air attack.
On November 27, the War and Navy Departments suggested that we send from the island of Oahu, fifty per cent of the Army's resources in pursuit planes.
These proposals came to me on the very same day of the so-called "war warning."
In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the "war warning" was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.
From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the information which I had from the Navy Department or from any other source, confirmed, and was consistent, with the Japanese movement in South East Asia described in the dispatch of November 27.
On November 27, 1941, General Short received the following message from the Army chief of staff in Washington:
No 472 November 27, 1941Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all prac. tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. (Italics supplied.)
In reply to the order in the foregoing message to, "Report measures taken," General Short sent this message: "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty seven."
The words, "reurad four seven two twenty seven" are Army language meaning "replying to your message number 472 of the 27th."
Recorded testimony shows this report was read by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of War Plans Army and the Chief of War Plans Navy. There can be no reasonable doubt this report was read and understood by the responsible officials in Washington. After receipt of this report, Washington not only failed to indicate disagreement but on November 28 sent two messages to the Hawaiian command detailing the steps to be taken to prevent sabotage, espionage and subversive activity.[27] For nine days the War Department failed to express any disapproval of this alert and likewise failed to give General Short any information which was calculated to make him change the alert, although a wealth of vital information obtained from decoded Japanese intercepts was received in Washington during these nine days, as well as in the preceding two months, all of which was withheld from General Short.
There is no doubt the alert prescribed by General Short met with the approval of the administration in Washington until clamor over the catastrophe of December 7 demanded a scapegoat. The administration provided two scapegoats.
On November 30, the Navy Department sent, for information, a dispatch addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet. This stated there were indications that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.[28] The commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet was directed to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for information another dispatch which was addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya.[29] Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malaya into Thailand. Thailand would then call Britain an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid. This would facilitate the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and give Japan air bases in the Kra Peninsula, and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya.
From the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the China coast, and other sources, we had reports of the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed south. Movements of troops, tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft, transports, and naval vessels had been sighted moving to the Kra Peninsula.[30]
On December 6, 1941, the commander-in-chief of the Asi atic Fleet reported various large Japanese forces apparently making for Kohtron.[31] These consisted of one twenty-five-ship convoy with an escort of six cruisers and ten destroyers, and another ten-ship convoy with two cruisers and ten destroyers. The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indo-China.
In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese military and naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in the dispatch of 27 November that the Japanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in South East Asia.
The fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations issued by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941, stated on page one: "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand."[32] The same publication, on page nine, under the heading "The Japanese Naval Situation," stated definitely: "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."
On December 3, 1941, I received intelligence that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy most of their codes.[33] This dispatch stated "most of their codes and ciphers"—not all—a point which was noted by me and my staff at the time. This information appeared to fit in with the information we had received about a Japanese movement in South East Asia. Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event that her action in South East Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over her diplomatic residences.
In addition to actual observation, there was another way of obtaining some indications of Japanese fleet movements. This was the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rests on an attempted identification of call signs of various enemy ships and of subdivision commanders in the enemy fleet. The call sign is a group of letters and numbers used by a ship to identify itself much as a radio station announces itself as "Station WABC." The location of the ships from whence the call signs emanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 we had direction finders at Manila, Guam and Pearl Harbor. We made a daily traffic analysis. I went over the material with care.
The charge has been made that the failure to identify and locate the Japanese carriers by traffic analysis should have been taken as evidence that they were on their way to attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. There is no basis for such a charge.
Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimates of enemy fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is open to serious doubts. To illustrate: On December 8, 1941, after the attack, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to me for information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysis made by the communication intelligence unit in Manila. It stated:
The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries since December first and are conservative:
...Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.[34]
This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier "Akagi" early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south from Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know that the carrier "Akagi" was in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor and could not possibly be moving south from Japan on December 8.
I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, which this dispatch illustrates. May I point out how these mistaken estimates arise.
Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and that direction finders locate in the China Sea the ship from which this call sign issues. The crucial question still remains: What ship is using the call sign "KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a carrier, or some auxiliary? The actual intelligence transmitted by the ship having the call sign "KAGA" affords the best clue to her identity. The analyst, however, does not have that intelligence unless he knows the text of the message which the ship is sending. Until then his estimate of the identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on assumptions which are open to question, and may be in error.
When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships in a fleet are changed, there is a considerable period during which the location of the fleet units, through traffic analysis, is practically impossible.
The Japanese navy changed its call signs on May 1, 1941. It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs had been identified to make the location and identification of ships and subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to merit any real consideration.
Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese navy were changed. About the end of November we had reached a point where the number of identified calls made the data as reliable as such data can be. Then on December 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese navy were again changed. This second change within one month was entirely consistent with preparation for the anticipated movement to South East Asia by Japan.
From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequence of the change in call signs, the data which we obtained from traffic analysis was fragmentary. Out of twenty thousand calls involved in the change, only two hundred service calls had been partially identified.[35] After December 1, practically all Japanese naval traffic was in a code which we were unable to read.
During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941, there was a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese carrier calls were not identified, nor were the calls of the major part of the Japanese fleet. The failure to identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failure to identify the calls on other major units of the Japanese fleet, which did not come to Pearl Harbor. The failure to identify the carrier calls did not indicate that the carriers were not a part of the fleets which were known to be moving to South East Asia.
Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that the carriers were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possible that the carriers were originating traffic and that their traffic was included within the great volume of unidentified traffic. Even on the assumption that the Japanese carriers were not originating radio traffic, it would not follow that the carriers were engaged on a secret mission. When ships are within the immediate location of shore stations, they do not ordinarily transmit over long distances, because their traffic is handled through shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may merely mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in home waters.
The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the location of the greater numbers of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty-four days—in twelve separate periods, each ranging from nine to twenty-two days— when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.[36]
In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, I had no evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route to Oahu. Radio traffic analysis did not locate their positions. But this was not a new or unusual condition. It was inherent in the changes of call signs. It had existed on twelve other occasions over a six months period.
The dispatch of November 27 stated that Japanese-American negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ceased. The Navy Department did not let this statement stand without modification. On November 29, two days later, the Navy Department sent me a dispatch which quoted the War Department's message to General Short of November 27. This stated: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest possibility of resumption." (Italics supplied.)[37]
This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next few days" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the period within which the Japanese action would come. Further, there was a public resumption of Japanese-American negotiations after November 27. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after November 29. In the absence of more authoritative information, I took account of this public information as to diplomatic developments. This suggested a lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called "war warning" dispatch.
The Navy Department did not inform me of the contents of the American note to Japan on November 26, or that the prevalent opinion in the Navy Department was that the proposals contained in that note were so drastic as to make Japanese acceptance of them impossible.[38] In a letter of November 14, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall. This memorandum advised against direct United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."
I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing the negotiations after November 26 only as a device to cover up their war plans. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact.[39] I was not informed that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26, the Japanese considered that negotiations had not merely ceased but that relations with this country were ruptured. The Navy Department knew also this to be the fact.[40]
The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to the effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 was a pale reflection of actual events; so partial a statement as to be misleading. The parties had not merely stopped talking. They were at swordspoints. So far as Japan was concerned, the talking which went on after November 26 was play-acting. It was a Japanese strategem to conceal a blow which Japan was preparing to deliver. The strategem did not fool the Navy Department. The Navy Department knew the scheme. The Pacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese strategem because the Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of the Japanese trick.
In the November 29th dispatch after quoting the Army message, the Chief of Naval Operations added the following direction:
W.P.L.—52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in South East Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in W.P.L. 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.
W.P.L. 46 was the Navy Basic War Plan which assigned tasks to the Pacific Fleet.
W.P.L.-52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders. It was charged with the task of destroying German and Italian naval, land, and air forces encountered in the area of the western Atlantic. The South East Pacific Sub Area covered approximately seven hundred miles of the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of South America. Here the South East Pacific Naval Force had similar shooting orders and a similar task. In the dispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations in formed me that W.P.L.-52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not have shooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act. Although this dispatch was sent me for information I was as much bound by these orders as though I had been an action addressee.
The same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16, 1941:
You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.
Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me by the Chief of Naval Operations in his message of November 29:
The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. . . . Measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent.
The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over 130,000 Japanese, any one of whom could watch its movements. You can appreciate the psychological handicaps orders of this kind placed upon us. In effect, I was told:
"Do take precautions."
"Do not alarm civilians."
"Do take a preparatory deployment."
"Do not disclose intent."
"Do take a defensive deployment."
"Do not commit the first overt act."
One last feature of the so-called "war warning" dispatch remains to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." Under WPL-46 the first task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the forces of the Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malaya Barrier.
The Navy Department emphasized this instruction by repeating it on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed: "Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."
Thus, in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy Department to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move against the Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East.
This was a determinative factor in the most difficult and vital decisions I had to make thereafter. There was not a hint in these two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area nor of the United States ultimatum to Japan.
The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W.P. Pac-46) prescribed a definite plan of operations to enable the fleet to carry out its basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls. This plan was called the "Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding."[41]
We planned to send all three task forces of the fleet to commence the attacks on selected islands of the Marshall group and to start the movement one day after hostilities with Japan began. The plans for this operation were worked out in detail. We were conscious of the great value of speed in setting the operation in motion. Any delay would decrease its effect, and its entire purpose would be frustrated if it were not undertaken promptly because its object was to divert Japanese strength away from the so-called Malay Barrier, the British and Dutch East Indies.
The patrol planes of the fleet were detailed to search out the areas in which the fleet would operate in its raids on the Marshall Islands. Within five days after war commenced the maximum practicable number of patrol planes were to be based on Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands. Planes so based were to make a reconnaissance of Taongi and Bikar on the fifth day after hostilities commenced or as soon thereafter as practicable. Not less than two patrol plane squadrons were to operate from Oahu.
The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vital air reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force! Without it, the task forces might be exposed to surprise attack if they entered the dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensable feature of the entire operation.
I made a daily revision of a memorandum entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next twenty-four hours." The last form of this memorandum I reviewed and approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. In it I attempted to keep the basic plan of the raid on the Marshall Islands up to date and in conformity with the existing dispositions of fleet units. The last issue of this memorandum, dated December 6, 1941, is as follows:
The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated with the basic plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP Plans" which were to "become effective without special reference" were the plans for the operation of the patrol plane force. Paragraph 2 (c), (d), and (e) had reference to the existing disposition of fleet units on December 5 and 6. Admiral Halsey at that time was returning from an expedition to Wake Island with a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl Harbor to refuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to the Marshalls. The carrier "Lexington" on December 6 was en route to Midway. She was in a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 12. In the event of hostilities I planned to have the "Lexington" carry out the Midway expedition and proceed to Wake there to be joined by the commander of Task Force 3, of which the Lexington was a regular component. Admiral Wilson Brown, the commander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged in operations in the vicinity of Johnston Island. I planned to have him leave that area and join the Lexington group, thereby bringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 3 would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2. When these task forces joined, they would proceed with the reconnaissance features of the raiding plan as a preliminary to the actual raids on the Marshall Islands.
This initial expedition was to continue operating as long as we could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it would require continuous operation of maximum patrol plane strength from four to six weeks. Additional expeditions were to be undertaken as rapidly as events and forces permitted.
I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant reconnaissance from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27, 1941.
By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department had urged me to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake by aircraft carrier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28 I was sending a carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes, and that I expected thereafter to send other Marine planes to Midway.
I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planes be sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was desirable that the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strong as possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course, not enough to save that island. Together with its other defenses, they could make the capture of the island sufficiently costly to justify sending them there. The actual results in the defense of Wake after December 7 demonstrated that fact.
The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.
On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier "Enterprise," three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to three hundred miles with his planes for any sign of hostile shipping.[42]
On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consisting of the carrier "Lexington," three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Newton, like Halsey, conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance.[43]
On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises.
Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces of the fleet each deployed in a different area. The "Lexington" and the "Enterprise" were each conducting air searches. It was a more intensive search in the areas covered than could have been made by patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, as they approached the outlying islands, these searches were conducted at a much greater distance from Oahu than any patrol plane based on Oahu could travel.
In addition to the operations of these task forces, other distant reconnaissance was conducted by the fleet after November 27.
Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake on December 2, and 3, they searched to a distance of 525 miles.[44]
I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake.[45] This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way to Johnston, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than five hundred miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6.[46] On December 7, five of these Midway-based patrol planes were searching the sector one hundred twenty to one hundred seventy degrees from Midway, to a distance of four hundred fifty miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the "Lexington" at a point four hundred miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on ten-minute notice as a ready striking force.[47]
When the "Enterprise" completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route.
In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons—moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor—covered a total distance of nearly five thousand miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a four-hundred-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the coverage of air search about two million square miles of ocean area.
In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously.
At Oahu before the attack, there were forty-nine patrol planes which were in flying condition. Eight other planes were out of commission and undergoing repair. In addition, on December 5, a squadron of patrol planes returned to Pearl Harbor after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake. This squadron consisted of obsolete PBY-3 planes, approaching eighteen months' service and past due for overhaul. It was not available for distant searches.
The forty-nine flyable patrol planes on Oahu were part of the planes which had arrived during the preceding four weeks (eighteen on October 28, twenty-four on November 23, and twelve on November 28). These planes were of the PBY-5 type. They were experiencing the shake-down difficulties of new planes. There was considerable difficulty due to the cracking of new engine sections, which required replacement. A program for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on these planes was underway.[48] The leakproof tanks and armor were necessary to make these planes ready for war. That work had to be carried out in Hawaii. Under War Plans the planes were to operate from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra Islands. There, they would operate from aircraft tenders. There were no facilities at those advanced bases to complete important material installations. The planes had to be in the highest condition of fighting efficiency before they left Oahu.
There was a total absence of spare parts for these planes.
There were no spare crews.
To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of eight hundred miles on a three hundred sixty degree arc. This requires eighty-four planes on one flight of sixteen hours. Of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make that sixteen-hour flight every day. For searches of his character over a protracted period, a pool of two hundred fifty planes would be required. These are fundamental principles. You will find them in the testimony of expert aviation officers before the Naval Court; and in the very comprehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942, on the subject: "Airplane Situation in Hawaiian Area."
It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planes to conduct each day a three hundred sixty-degree search from the island of Oahu. That fact is beyond controversy.
A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protection. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some other sector within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of detecting the enemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his official letter on the subject. He said:
It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.[49]
Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart of the problem which I faced.
The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry has stated:
There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, available in Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.
This statement assumes a twenty-five-mile visibility for each patrol plane engaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of ships in and out of the harbor and in the operating area.
If I had instituted a distant search of any one hundred twenty-eight-degree sector around Oahu on and after November 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have deprived the Pacific Fleet of any efficient patrol plane force for its prescribed war missions.
In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, from which I was excluded, Vice Admiral Bellinger, who commanded my patrol plane force, testified:
Q. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?
A. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight. (Italics supplied.)[50]
This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol plane squadrons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter.
Captain Ramsey, the executive officer of the patrol wing, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry as follows:
. . . As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 per cent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.[51]
The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a definite program for their operation which was consistent with creating and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and northwest of Oahu to a distance of four hundred miles, after which the planes required maintenance and upkeep.[52] This was not distant reconnaissance, as such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol out three hundred miles to cover the areas where the fleet operated.
I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out the raids on the Marshalls under WPL-46, which meant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advance bases in war operations.
I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a matter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with their war tasks in front of me.
Had I directed their use for intensive distant searches from Oahu, I would have faced the peril of having those planes grounded when the fleet needed them and when the war plan was executed.
I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basis of five days or ten days of distant searches.
I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointing to Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack.
I knew that any distant search I could make on an intensive basis, straining the planes to the breaking point, would be in its nature partial and ineffective.
I took account of my resources. They were slender.
I took account of my probable future needs and of my orders from the Navy Department.
I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy of the name for the fleet's expected movement into the Marshalls.
I considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and the patrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands.
I considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition.
I considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areas against the submarine menace and these I carried out.
I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emergency distant searches.
I considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleet movements in and out of the harbor—which might have to be quickly and unexpectedly executed.
I considered the endurance of my patrol plane man power— and the absence of any spare crews.
I decided I could not fritter away my patrol plane resources by pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector around Oahu—which within the predictable future would have to be discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.
The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of Inquiry (Admiral Orin G. Murfin, former commander in chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, former commander battle force, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, former commander of the scouting force) scrutinized my decision after extensive testimony. Each of the admirals could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the field. They summarized the problem:
The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.
The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance.
The Court concluded: (Finding XIII)
The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.
I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships of the Pacific Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left for Wake with a carrier task force and on December 5, Admiral Newton left for Midway with another carrier task force. These missions were in pursuance of an explicit suggestion from the Navy Department. When Admiral Halsey left for Wake on November 28, the three battleships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl Harbor so as to avoid creating the impression that there was anything unusual about the movement of his task force. However, immediately on clearing the channel, Admiral Halsey diverted his battleships and instructed them to carry out exercises in the Hawaiian area. He then headed west with the remainder of his task force.
It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have taken along the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleships was seventeen knots. The fleet units which he took to Wake could make thirty knots. To take his battleships with him would have meant the loss of thirteen knots of potential speed. He was bound for dangerous waters where curtailed speed might spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his force could attain. Three battleships did not furnish sufficient supporting strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed and mobility which their presence in the expedition to Wake would entail. Moreover, it was necessary to complete the Wake operation as quickly as possible so that the ships engaged might be ready for further eventualities.
Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific with the forces available to me had its cost. In sending the two carriers to Wake and Midway, I took from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the time being, the fleet's air strength. We had no carrier left in the Hawaiian area. The "Saratoga," the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, had been undergoing repair and overhaul on the West Coast. The advisability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighter planes from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28.[53] The absence of the carriers from the Hawaiian area temporarily limited the mobility of the battleships which were left behind.
While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions to Midway and Wake, the battleships force was kept in Pearl Harbor. To send them to sea without air cover for any prolonged period would have been a dangerous course. The only effective defense for vessels at sea from air attacks, whether it be a bombing attack or a torpedo plane attack, is an effective air cover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, are much less effective against an air attack. That is so today. It was the more so prior to 7 December because of the existing inadequacies of antiaircraft guns.
The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships at sea. The few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for use by catapult are not fighters. Their function is only scouting and reconnaissance. They are ineffective as a defense against enemy air attack. The battleships at sea without carriers had no protection from air bombing attack. In Pearl Harbor they had the protection of such antiaircraft defenses as the Army had, including shore based fighter planes. At sea, in deep waters, there were no physical barriers to the effectiveness of torpedo plane attack. In Pearl Harbor, where the depth of water was less than forty feet, a torpedo plane attack was considered a negligible danger. The battleships of the fleet at sea, without carriers, sighted by a force of such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, appeared to be more subject to damage than in port.
Vice Admiral Pye, commander of the battle force, and I discussed these considerations in a conference after the receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch.
At the time of our discussion—at that time and later—we did not have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicating that the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked for attack. We had no information that an air attack upon Pearl Harbor was imminent or probable. The fact that the Navy Department proposed at this time that our carriers be sent to the outlying islands indicated to us that the Navy Department felt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected in the immediate future.
All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as the presence of the battleships in port, were known to the Navy Department. Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Roberts Commission as follows:
What we expected him [Admiral Kimmell] to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway, and were expected to go on the fifth or sixth day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces, there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.[54]
Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I issued orders to the fleet to exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.[55] My dispatch of November 28 to the fleet containing this order was forwarded to the Navy Department on that day. On December 2, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations directing his personal attention to this order. The Navy Department, in the ten days prior to the attack, did not approve or disapprove my action.
For some time there had been reports of submarines in the operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week of February 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reported about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately forty-eight hours, after which the contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations, stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in the operating area around Hawaii.[56] I was directed by dispatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three-mile limit.
A similar contact at approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted.
On September 12, 1941, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and asked him "What to do about the submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity." I stated, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive areas. Should we now bomb contacts without waiting to be attacked?"
On September 23, the Chief of Naval Operations replied to my question in a personal letter. He said:
The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step.
No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7, 1941.
The files of the commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records of at least three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor.
On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41. The patrol plane searched a fifteen-mile area. A sound search was made by the "U.S.S. Worden," and an investigation was made by the "U.S.S. Dale," all of them producing negative results.[57] On November 28, 1941, the "U.S.S. Helena" reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area.[58] A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the "U.S.S. Gamble" reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.[59] On the morning of the attack, the "U.S.S. Ward" reported to the commandant of the 14th Naval District that it had attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the defensive sea area. The commandant of the 14th Naval District directed a verification of this report with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen by the "Ward." He also directed that the ready-duty destroyer assist the "Ward" in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact, the "Ward" also reported that it had intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier report of the submarine contact.
Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the staff duty officer concerning the "Ward's" report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the "Ward", and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the "Ward's" report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified in the past.